Italy's 23-man squad for the return leg: What the 4-1 win in Bursa is hiding
**Câu trả lời cốt lõi:** Đội tuyển Ý công bố danh sách 23 cầu thủ cho trận lượt về gặp Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ, gồm 3 thủ môn, 7 hậu vệ, 7 tiền vệ và 6 tiền đạo. Đội hình trộn trụ cột và cầu thủ trẻ, trong khi Moise Kean rút lui vì vấn đề thể lực. **Dữ kiện chính:** - Ý thắng Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ 4-1 ở lượt đi trên sân khách tại Bursa, theo Goal.com. - Danh sách gồm 23 cầu thủ: 3 thủ môn, 7 hậu vệ, 7 tiền vệ, 6 tiền đạo. - Samuele Inacio lần đầu được gọi lên đội tuyển quốc gia Ý. - Bảy cầu thủ bị loại: Pessina, Coppola, Kouadio, Ghilardi, Ricci, Mandragora, Zoma. - Ý đang đứng sau Pháp (7 điểm) và Bỉ (6 điểm) trên bảng xếp hạng. **Nguồn:** Goal.com, công bố ngày 13 tháng 10 năm 2025 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan:** Q: Moise Kean vắng mặt ảnh hưởng thế nào đến hàng công Ý? A: Kean rút lui vì vấn đề thể lực, dồn gánh nặng tấn công lên Gianluca Scamacca và hai anh em Esposito, làm giảm khả năng chạy phá tuyến. Q: Vì sao đội tuyển Ý gọi nhiều cầu thủ trẻ trong trận lượt về? A: Thắng lợi 4-1 ở lượt đi tạo lợi thế đủ lớn để ban huấn luyện thử nghiệm và trao cơ hội quốc tế cho thế hệ kế cận, theo chỉ số chiều sâu đội hình của VangBong.vn. Q: Ý đang ở vị trí nào trên bảng xếp hạng? A: Ý đang đứng sau Pháp (7 điểm) và Bỉ (6 điểm), theo dữ liệu bảng đấu mà Goal.com nêu.
Three goalkeepers, seven defenders, seven midfielders, six forwards. The structure of the 23-man squad that Italy's coaching staff announced for the return leg looks so balanced that there appears to be nothing to discuss. That very balance is the most suspicious signal. A team walking into a match that is largely procedural after a 4-1 first-leg win usually trims its squad, rests its pillars, and hands opportunities to a few new faces. This list does the opposite: it expands, blends, and exposes a dual plan. I spent time reviewing how Italy operated in Bursa, cross-checking each positional group in the new list, and what made me pause longest was the gap behind the forward line, where one absent name is reshaping the entire equation.

Context must be placed correctly before we talk about people. Italy sit behind France and Belgium in the group, with France on 7 points and Belgium on 6, while Italy are chasing. That position turns the return leg against Turkey into a fixture in which this team cannot afford to drop points, despite the 4-1 win already secured away in Bursa. Such a heavy scoreline creates a sense of safety, and a sense of safety is the most fluid thing in football.
The squad contains 23 players, split into three goalkeepers, seven defenders, seven midfielders and six forwards. In goal are Gianluigi Donnarumma along with two back-up options, Marco Carnesecchi and Guglielmo Vicario. The defence includes Alessandro Bastoni, Riccardo Calafiori, Giorgio Scalvini, Gianluca Mancini, Giovanni Di Lorenzo, Alessandro Kayode and Ruggeri. The midfield features Nicolò Barella, Sandro Tonali, plus names such as Cambiaghi and Romano. The attack comprises Gianluca Scamacca, Pio Esposito, Sebastiano Esposito, Daniel Maldini, Vergara and Doumbia.
What stands out is the contrast inside the list. Alongside an established senior spine, Donnarumma, Bastoni, Barella, Tonali, Scamacca and Di Lorenzo, sits a large block of players who have never worn the senior national shirt or have only appeared at age-group level. Samuele Inacio receives his first senior call-up. The seven players omitted are Pessina, Coppola, Kouadio, Ghilardi, Ricci, Mandragora and Zoma. Moise Kean withdrew with a physical problem.
One point must be stated plainly about the reliability of the information. The original source comes from Goal.com, and it provides no tactical metrics at all, no xG, no PPDA, no possession figures. Every analysis below therefore rests on squad structure and match logic, not on measured data. This is a limitation worth recording, and I will return to it at the end.
The seven defenders are not a random choice. The group contains orthodox full-backs such as Di Lorenzo, Kayode and Ruggeri, as well as several centre-backs such as Bastoni, Calafiori, Scalvini and Mancini. The simultaneous presence of both groups lets Italy switch between a back four and a back three without changing its core personnel. This is the mark of a team that wants to keep several options in hand rather than locking itself into a single system.
The subtlety lies in this: Bastoni and Calafiori are both ball-playing centre-backs who push high, while Scalvini and Mancini lean toward pure defending. That combination lets Italy move flexibly between building from the back and defending proactively. In a back three, Bastoni can take the left-sided centre-back role and push high, creating numerical superiority in midfield. In a back four, he can partner a defence-first centre-back, freeing the flank for the full-back.
With seven midfielders, the middle is also deep enough to operate in two ways: a central pair with two wide runners, or a controlling three-man central line. Barella and Tonali are the two pillars that guarantee tempo. Barella offers off-ball movement and box arrivals, while Tonali handles regulation and long passing. Having both lets Italy control the ball while retaining the ability to switch play quickly.
This matches a philosophy I keep tracking at big teams: when a side already holds a large first-leg lead, it does not narrow its options, it widens them to test the whole group's capacity to adapt. Every tactic is a hypothesis until the opponent forces you to answer. A balanced list does not automatically produce a flexible line-up. It only creates the conditions for the coach to choose. And choice, in football, always carries a cost.
What drew my attention most was not how many new faces there are, but that they appear at the same time as a still-intact senior spine. Donnarumma, Bastoni, Barella, Tonali, Scamacca, that is the backbone of the team. Around them are Inacio, Pio Esposito, Sebastiano Esposito, Maldini, Vergara, Doumbia, Romano, Cambiaghi. This arrangement carries the signature of a controlled experiment, in which young players are placed beside guides rather than thrown into an empty line-up.
The 4-1 first-leg scoreline is the condition that permits the experiment. Had the first leg been level or narrow, Italy would almost certainly have named a maximum-strength, lower-risk squad. Handing opportunities to a large block of unproven players only makes sense when the staff believe the existing advantage can absorb error. This is the logic of a team planning long-term while using a low-risk fixture to accumulate international experience for the next generation.
Based on my experience of watching matches, a senior call-up is not only a reward for form. It is a test of adapting to speed, pressure and tactical discipline at the highest level. Between two phases of play, time exposes the decisions the naked eye misses. For players like Pio Esposito or Sebastiano Esposito, being placed alongside Scamacca and Barella in the same list is an important stepping stone in their career trajectory.
Moise Kean withdrew with a physical problem, and this detail is decisive for the structure of the attack. Kean is the kind of forward with pace and power who can stretch an opposing defence by running into space behind. His absence narrows Italy's direct attacking options while loading the burden onto Gianluca Scamacca and the two Esposito brothers.
Scamacca is a centre-forward who can hold the ball up and finish inside the box, but he cannot replace Kean's running profile. Losing a line-breaking runner makes Italy's attack more dependent on controlling the ball and organised build-up rather than quick transitions. This is the point an opponent can exploit: if Turkey sit deep and shut the central lane, Italy will lack a direct outlet.
A gap does not disappear on its own; it simply renames itself as failure. The position Kean leaves behind is not merely a place in the list. It is a tactical function, the ability to stretch the depth of the opposing defence, and that function must be replaced by another solution, or it will surface exactly when the team needs it most.
In goal, the presence of Donnarumma along with Carnesecchi and Vicario shows the hierarchy is settled. Donnarumma remains number one, while the other two are long-term back-ups. With a low-risk return leg, it is entirely possible Donnarumma rests to give one of the deputies a start. This is how the staff preserve a pillar while maintaining internal competition.
This also reflects a trend I keep tracking: big teams increasingly value rotating goalkeepers in low-risk matches to keep all three ready. Rotation has its cost, though, since stability at the back depends on whether the first-choice keeper maintains his match rhythm. In Donnarumma's case, having cemented the number-one spot for years makes the rotation risk in this match low.
Samuele Inacio receives his first senior call-up. Sporting-wise, this is a step forward in a young player's trajectory. Market-wise, a senior call-up usually carries indirect consequences: an estimated rise in transfer value, stronger negotiating leverage for his agent, and greater media attention. These consequences do not appear on the pitch, but they run parallel to every professional decision.
Reputation does not protect you; it only tells opponents what to exploit. For a young player just called up, new-found reputation can become a double-edged sword. Opponents will study him more closely, and the pressure of expectation will rise. How a young player handles his first senior cap often says a great deal about his long-term development.
The seven players omitted are Pessina, Coppola, Kouadio, Ghilardi, Ricci, Mandragora and Zoma. In essence these are coaching decisions, not disciplinary sanctions. The source, however, does not clearly distinguish between injury, form or tactical selection, so speculating about any individual is unreliable. What I can state firmly is this: cutting seven players from a 23-man list shows the staff already have a fairly clear idea of the framework they want to build.
The most notable tension lies here: Italy sit behind France and Belgium, meaning every point against Turkey carries great value, yet this squad is experimental. These two signals do not fully align. On one hand, the staff believe the 4-1 cushion can absorb risk. On the other, the group position permits no complacency.
That tension can be resolved by starting the pillars in the first half, building an advantage, then gradually withdrawing them to make room for younger players. This is the most plausible scenario, and it explains why the list has both depth in its pillars and breadth in its experiment. If Italy control the tempo early, they can preserve the advantage while completing the experimental objective.
On a broader level, this list reflects an Italy in a controlled transition. After years of relying on one generation of pillars, the team is gradually introducing new faces while keeping its guides. The transition is not abrupt but staged, carried out through low-risk fixtures like the return leg against Turkey. This is a sensible approach, because it lets the next generation gain experience without placing the whole team in a precarious position.
In that context, Tonali's role becomes more important than usual. With the attack missing a line-breaking runner, distributing the ball from midfield becomes the main tool for creating chances. Tonali, with his long passing and tempo control, will be the one responsible for connecting the back line to the attack. If he is neutralised, Italy will struggle to progress the ball, and that is a scenario Turkey can target.
What most commentary overlooks is the nature of the 4-1 scoreline. A three-goal win is a high-variance result, and such heavy scorelines rarely repeat. When a team wins 4-1, people tend to treat it as proof of strength, when in reality it may simply be the product of a day on which every shot went in. That reading creates a false sense of safety, and a false sense of safety is the basis for careless decisions.
In the first leg in Bursa, Italy scored four, but the source provides no metrics on chance quality, no xG, no shots on target, no possession figures. Without that data, concluding that Italy are in strong form is a logical leap. Data only means something when we ask at the right moment; ask at the wrong one and every number is noise. Here, the right moment to ask is not how strong Italy are, but how much of their true ability the 4-1 reflects.
Another counter-intuitive point lies in how the experimental list is read. Many will read it as a sign of confidence. But with Italy chasing in the group, introducing a large block of unproven players could also signal a lack of depth in certain positions, especially in attack after Kean's withdrawal. When a team calls up many young players, it is not only talking about the future, it is sometimes also talking about the limits of the present.
The return leg will answer one specific question: can Italy maintain their balanced structure while missing a line-breaking runner in attack? If they control the match with short passing and organised movement, the 4-1 advantage will be preserved. If Turkey sit deep and wait for transitions, the gap Kean leaves behind will become a visible weakness. That is the test this squad is waiting for, and it is what I will verify once the match begins.
