Trang chủInternational FootballInfantino faces FIFA rebels in Zurich after failed World Cup stake sale
Infantino faces FIFA rebels in Zurich after failed World Cup stake sale
Gianni Infantino đang đối mặt với cuộc nổi loạn từ ba liên đoàn UEFA, AFC và CONCACAF sau khi kế hoạch tư nhân hóa FIFA Forward Enterprise sụp đổ. Kế hoạch bán cổ phần thiểu số cho công ty do Joshua Kushner sáng lập đã bị hủy bỏ trong vài ngày, làm dấy lên lo ngại về xung đột lợi ích và quản trị yếu kém. Các liên đoàn nổi loạn đang thúc đẩy rà soát quản trị để hạn chế quyền lực của Infantino, nhưng cuộc bầu cử tháng 3 năm 2027 tại Rabat vẫn nghiêng về đương kim chủ tịch do thiếu ứng cử viên nặng ký.
The FIFA Council meeting in Zurich on October 14 became the center of an unprecedented power struggle in the history of world football's governing body. President Gianni Infantino, still regarded as the overwhelming favorite for the next term, is facing a well-orchestrated wave of opposition from three continental confederations: UEFA, AFC, and CONCACAF. The immediate cause stems from the collapse of the FIFA Forward Enterprise privatization plan, an initiative announced in July but abandoned within days following intense pressure from member associations.
FIFA Forward Enterprise was designed as a commercial subsidiary of FIFA, with plans to sell a minority stake to private investors. The lead investor was identified as a company founded and operated by Joshua Kushner, brother of Jared Kushner. The deal was expected to bring external capital to help FIFA distribute $20 million to each member association, plus a potential additional $20 million, equivalent to a total value ranging from $4.22 billion to $8.44 billion. However, the proposal faced fierce opposition from wealthy confederations, particularly UEFA and CONCACAF, which argued that selling a stake in FIFA's commercial arm represented a serious erosion of global football governance.
Countering Infantino's plan, UEFA and CONCACAF proposed a direct cash distribution model: $10 million to each of the 211 member associations, equivalent to approximately $2.11 billion. The difference between the two models lies not only in the figures but also in financial philosophy. The FFE plan sought to monetize FIFA's commercial future by attracting external private capital, while the UEFA and CONCACAF proposal would spend from FIFA's internal reserves. The two approaches are considered irreconcilable, reflecting a fundamental battle over how FIFA raises and distributes its resources.
Notably, the involvement of a politically connected investor like Kushner has raised concerns about conflicts of interest and political interference in FIFA's commercial governance. Combined with FIFA's controversial award of a Peace Prize to Donald Trump, this has heightened perceptions of political alignment between FIFA's leadership and external political forces. These factors have contributed to an atmosphere of discontent among member associations.
Against this backdrop, the presidents of UEFA, AFC, and CONCACAF have publicly called for a change at the top of FIFA. However, their objective is not to win the election but to isolate Infantino and curb his powers. This is an implicit acknowledgment that removing the incumbent is unfeasible in the current electoral cycle. The new strategy focuses on promoting an independent governance review, hoping to create institutional constraints on the president's commercial autonomy.
However, even insiders are skeptical about the effectiveness of this strategy. Miguel Maduro, former chairman of the FIFA Governance Committee, who was sacked by Infantino in 2026, offered a blunt prediction: any announced review will be mere "window dressing" and will not bring substantive change. This assessment undermines confidence in FIFA's ability to genuinely reform, while reflecting a troubling pattern: the president has removed important internal checks in the past.
In terms of support, Infantino still maintains significant backing from other regions. In Cape Verde, African leaders gave him a standing ovation, a sign that the African bloc's loyalty remains solid. South America is expected to continue supporting him, and within Asia, the Arab bloc is believed to side with the incumbent. This polarization shows that the global football governance picture is not a clean two-bloc split but a multi-layered struggle in which even the rebel confederations have internal contradictions.
A case in point is AFC. President Salman Al Khalifa has publicly called for change, but most Asian member associations, especially the Arab bloc, support Infantino. This raises a question about the legitimacy of AFC's leadership when it may be speaking against the will of a large portion of its membership. Similarly, in Africa, although CAF has traditionally been a reliable source of support for Infantino through development funding and representation programs, this support may also reflect patronage dynamics rather than genuine consensus on governance.
Money plays a central role in this battle. The competing distribution proposals, $10 million versus $20 million plus $20 million, are essentially tools to buy the loyalty and votes of member associations. Wealthy confederations like UEFA and CONCACAF are less dependent on FIFA distributions, so their rebellion is driven by ideological and governance motives. By contrast, poorer associations are financially captured by whoever pays more, creating a structural asymmetry in the power struggle.
An underappreciated financial concern is the budget gap after FFE's collapse. The plan was abandoned, but expectations for the $10 million to $40 million per association distribution remain intact. If FIFA's reserves are insufficient to cover this expenditure, then the generous distribution promises made by the rebel forces may only be achievable through the very privatization mechanism they rejected. This is a paradoxical logical trap, illustrating the complexity of the financial equation FIFA faces.
Electorally, Infantino is still assessed as having a high likelihood of winning. The FIFA presidential election is expected to take place in March 2027 in Rabat, Morocco, with the nomination deadline on November 18. The only candidate mentioned besides the incumbent is Ramon Vega, a former Switzerland and Tottenham Hotspur defender. However, Vega has not confirmed the five-nation backing required to qualify for the race, and his chances are considered remote.
The absence of a heavyweight challenger at this stage is a significant data point. Serious candidates typically declare their intention early to build momentum before the deadline. The absence of anyone of sufficient stature suggests potential candidates are waiting to see whether Infantino is fatally weakened before committing. This is a "wait-and-see" posture reflecting the caution of forces wanting change but not yet daring to act.
The FIFA Council meeting in Zurich also signaled the leadership's strategy. Placing governance on the agenda, along with discussions about financial reserves, is assessed as a pre-emptive containment move. By appearing willing to discuss reform, Infantino can ease external pressure while still protecting the substance of his power. This is a familiar crisis management tactic, in which form is conceded to preserve content.
Overall, the power picture at FIFA is at a state of high tension but has not yet reached a climax. Resignation calls have been made, but no candidate strong enough has emerged, and the incumbent still maintains broad support across blocs. There is a clear gap between media heat and institutional reality: the story reads like a crisis, but the arithmetic of the FIFA Congress still favors the incumbent. This is a classic example of the gap between noise and structure.
The biggest short-term risk for Infantino is not losing the election but losing autonomy. The rebels' "curb his powers" objective is a fallback scenario designed to create institutional constraints even if the leader cannot be changed. In the long term, the combination of the post-FFE financial gap, governance review pressure, and controversial political associations could gradually erode Infantino's position, even if he remains in power.
For Vietnamese football and Southeast Asia, these developments are significant. Smaller member associations are often targets in vote-seeking campaigns, and FIFA financial distributions are essential resources for grassroots football development. Instability at FIFA's highest governance level could affect future financial flows and development programs, while raising the question of which side smaller federations should support in the struggle between the incumbent president and reformist forces.
As the November 18 nomination deadline approaches, all eyes will be on whether a genuine challenger emerges. If not, the March 2027 election in Rabat may be an uncomplicated re-election for Infantino, but with a weakened political position and a controversial governance legacy. The big remaining question is whether FIFA can find a sustainable financial model and a more balanced governance structure before the next term begins, or whether it will continue to be mired in power struggles and controversial commercial deals.
Integrity monitoring groups like SIGA and former officials like Maduro are calling for a genuinely independent review of FIFA's power structure. However, with the Governance Committee dissolved and critics removed from positions, the prospect of genuine institutional reform remains very murky. The battle in Zurich is not just about a failed deal or an upcoming election, but about the future of global football governance in the coming decade.
Cầu thủ liên quan
Bài đề xuất
Indonesia Tests a West Asian Away Fixture Before the 2027 Asian Cup: Herdman and a Preparation Plan Without Data2026-10-14
World Cup 2030: When Morocco's Prime Minister Strikes the Federation President, the Final Slips Away from Casablanca2026-09-12
Umtiti, Three Stars, and the Gaps That Never Disappear: Decoding Real Madrid After Their 2-1 Win Over Inter Milan2026-09-10
Europe's Matchday and the Trap of Small Samples2026-09-13
Netherlands 2-2 Greece: When Quinten Timber Becomes the Data Gap in Midfield2026-10-02
The Shin Tae-yong Chant at GBK: A 0-0 Draw and the Quiet Anger of a Captain2026-09-29
Bài đề xuất
The Heat Map Doesn't Lie — But It Knows How to Stay Silent2026-09-17
Fenerbahce Pursues Brahim Diaz: A Mid-Season Transfer Bombshell2026-10-15
The Islamabad Cricket Stadium, the "Olympic Village", and the Papers Nobody Has Read to the End2026-10-13
The analysis that came back empty: when silence is read as a conclusion2026-10-05
The Dead Zone of Data: When Football Analysis Is Built on Silence2026-09-14
FIFA's Gift and the Weight of Reality for Indonesia's National Team2026-09-30
Bài đề xuất
Højlund, the Post-Whistle Shove and the Gap VAR Cannot Fill2026-10-03
Piojo Alvarado or Santiago Sandoval: Chivas Is Comparing Two Different Things2026-09-15
The Empty Data Cell and the Biggest Trap of the Transfer Window2026-10-02
83 Minutes of a €125m Signing: Real Madrid's Crowded Right Flank2026-09-12
Nine Empty Boxes in a Scouting Report and the Trap of 'No Risk Found'2026-10-22
Popov Stays Silent After the Loss to Công an TP.HCM: The Price of a Word About the Referee2026-10-20
